# THE ANCIENT GREEK SOURCES OF BYZANTINE ABSOLUTISM

BY

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IN VIEW OF PROFESSOR WOLFSON'S extraordinary versatility and wide mastery of the entire history of philosophy, ancient, medieval, and modern, it is not difficult to select a topic suitable for presentation to him with affectionate greetings on the completion of

[1] This paper is a revised version of a small portion of the first chapter of my forthcoming book, *The Mind of Byzantium*. My colleague and dear friend, Professor Francis Dvornik, is now completing a large and important book on the sources and origins of Byzantine political theory from ancient times until 565, in which all the major problems will be treated in great detail. Note the following abbreviations:

BZ = *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*

HZ = *Historische Zeitschrift*.

On Byzantine political theory as a whole, see the bibliography set forth in my paper (note 43 below) and: Hans–G. Beck, "Reichsidee und nationale Politik im spätbyzantinischen Staat," *BZ*, 53 (1960), 86–94: old imperial notions prevailed until 1453; N.Q. King, "*There's such divinity doth hedge a king*." *Studies in ruler cult and the religion of sacral monarchy in some late fourth century Byzantine monuments* (Edinburg, 1960); Fritz Taeger, *Charisma, Studien zur Geschichte des antiken Herrscherkultes*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1957–60): pagan and early Christian period; Arnold A. Ehrhardt, *Politische Metaphysik von Solon bis Augustin*, 2 vols. (Tübingen, 1959); Friedrich Heiler, "Fortleben und Wandlungen des antiken Gottkönigtums im Christentum," *The sacral kingship* (*La regalità sacra: Numen*, Supplement 4 [Leiden, 1959]), 543–80; Ernest Barker, *Social and political thought in Byzantium from Justinian I to the last Palaeologus* (Oxford, 1957); *idem*, *From Alexander to Constantine, passages and documents illustrating the history of social and political ideas, 336 B.C.–A.D. 337* (Oxford, 1956); Rudolf Stanka, *Geschichte der politischen Philosophie*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1951–57): ancient and mediaeval; Franz Dölger, "Die Entwicklung der byzantinischen Kaisertitulatur und die Datierung von Kaiserdarstellungen in der byzantinischen Kleinkunst," in *idem*, *Byzantinische Diplomatik* (Ettal, 1956), pp. 130–51 = *Studies presented to David M. Robinson,*

his fifteenth lustrum. But since one of the most inspired chapters in his epoch-making book on Philo deals with political theory and its classical sources, I am taking the liberty of presenting a survey of the ancient Greek philosophical presuppositions of Byzantine autocracy.

Although this is one of the many subjects in which Professor Wolfson is an acknowledged expert, he may, perhaps, forgive me for traversing what is for him familiar ground. In the first

2 (1953), 985–1005; *idem*, "Die Kaiserurkunde der Byzantiner als Ausdruck ihrer politischen Anschauungen," *Byzanz und die europäische Staatenwelt* (Ettal, 1953), pp. 9–33 = *HZ*, 159 (1938–39), 229–50; *idem*, "Die 'Familie der Könige' im Mittelalter," *ibid.*, 34–69 = *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 60 (1940), 397–420; *idem* and A.M. Schneider, *Byzanz* (*Wissenschaftliche Forschungsberichte, Geisteswissenschaftliche Reihe*, 5, ed. Karl Hönn [Bern, 1952]), pp. 93–100; Otto Treitinger, *Die oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee nach ihrer Gestaltung im höfischen Zeremoniell*, 2d ed. (Darmstadt, 1956), contains also "Vom oströmischen Staats- und Reichsgedanken"; J. Karayannopulos, "Der frühbyzantinische Kaiser," *BZ*, 49 (1956), 369–84; Norman H. Baynes, *Byzantine studies and other essays* (London, 1955): "The Byzantine state," pp. 47 ff.; "Some aspects of Byzantine civilization," pp. 67 ff.; "Eusebius and the Christian Empire," pp. 168 ff.; cf. 343 ff., 348 ff.; Biondo Biondi, *Il diritto romano cristiano*, 3 vols. (Milan, 1952–54); Wilhelm Ensslin, "Der Kaiser in der Spätantike," *HZ*, 177 (1954), 449–68; *idem*, "The emperor and the imperial administration," *Byzantium, an introduction to East Roman civilization*, ed. Norman H. Baynes and H. St. L.B. Moss, corr. repr. (Oxford, 1949), pp. 268–307; Ernst Kantorowicz, "Kaiser Friedrich II. und das Königsbild des Hellenismus," *Varia variorum, Festgabe für Karl Reinhardt* (Münster-Cologne, 1952), pp. 169–93; Francis Dvornik, "Emperors, popes, and general councils," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 6 (1951), 1–23; Erik Peterson, *Theologische Traktate* (Munich, 1951): n.b. the important essays, "Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem," pp. 45–147 (previously published separately, Leipzig, 1935), and "Christus als Imperator," pp. 149–64 (Leipzig, 1937); Louis Bréhier, *Les institutions de l'empire byzantin* (*Le monde byzantin*, 2 [Paris, 1949]), 1–88, 430–46; Pietro de Francisci, *Arcana imperii*, 3 vols. in 4, n.b. vols.2, 3.1, and 3.2 (Milan, 1948); Kenneth M. Setton, *Christian attitude towards the emperor in the fourth century* (N.Y., 1941); Diogenes Xanalatos, *Byzantine studies, a contribution to the history of the Byzantine people* (in Greek) (*Texte und Forschungen zur byzantinisch – neugriechischen Philologie*, 38 [Athens, 1940]): on the "right" to oppose the emperor, learnedly argued, but I disagree; Johannes A. Straub, *Vom Herrscherideal in der Spätantike* (*Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte*, 18 [Stuttgart, 1939]); Ludwig Biehl, *Das*



place, even some of the most respectable authorities[2] still persist in describing Byzantine despotism as if it were an oriental phaenomenon. Secondly, I have had the privilege of discussing my theories on this subject with him on the basis of a preliminary draft of this paper. Everyone who is acquainted with him will understand how stimulating and fruitful such an experience can be — to say nothing of all the animation, enthusiasm and fire incidental thereto.

Naturally, he is in no way responsible for whatever errors discerning readers may find in what I have written. But I surmise that in general, he will not disagree violently with my conclusions. As he once said, "What makes that fellow" (i.e., one of those who regard Byzantine absolutism as 'oriental') "think the Byzantines could read cuneiform inscriptions or Egyptian hieroglyphics? or Persian?"

In dedicating this paper to him, I am mindful not only of the immense debt we owe him for his vast erudition and monumental generosity in sharing it with all of us on demand, but also, more particularly, of my deep personal gratitude for innumerable kindnesses — for advice, companionship, encouragement, and solace unstintingly given in the course of a friendship that has lasted over a quarter of a century.

As the result of recent investigations,[3] it has been proved that the

*liturgische Gebet für Kaiser und Reich, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Verhältnisses von Kirche und Staat* (*Görres-Gesellschaft zur Pflege der Wissenschaft im katholischen Deutschland*, 75 [Paderborn, 1937]); André Grabar, *L'empereur dans l'art byzantin* (Paris, 1936); Leo Berlinger, *Beiträge zur inoffiziellen Titulatur der römischen Kaiser* (Breslau, 1935); Erwin R. Goodenough, "The political philosophy of Hellenistic kingship," *Yale classical studies*, 1 (1928), 55–102.

[2] E.g., Alexander A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire, 324–1453* (Madison, 1952), p. 62, now available in paper-back reprint.

[3] These have been conducted and summarized by Andreas Alföldi, "Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells am römischen Kaiserhofe," *Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Römische Abt.*, 49 (1934), 1–118; *idem*, "Insignien und Tracht der römischen Kaiser," *ibid.*, 50 (1935), 1–171. Cf. *idem*, "Die Geburt der kaiserlichen Bildsymbolik, kleine Beiträge

insignia, dress, and ceremonial of the Byzantine imperial court, though in many instances ultimately oriental in origin, were not derived directly from the non-Greek world but reached Byzantium through the Graeco-Roman tradition, in which they had long been naturalized. As far as Byzantine political theory is concerned, however, there is in my opinion no sign of Eastern influence except that exerted by the Old and New Testaments. There were, of course, numerous parallels, Egyptian, Babylonian, Assyrian, and Persian. But these in themselves, apart from texts, monuments, or other evidence that establish a real link, actual or presumptive, between the East and Byzantine thought, prove nothing.

In point of fact, the major sources of Byzantine civilization as a whole were three in number: (1) the language and culture of ancient Greece, (2) Roman civilization, especially as manifested in law, the imperial administrative system, and art, and (3) the Christian heritage — the Bible and the dogma of the Church. All three were of great significance. But in this paper I will confine myself to the first of these — especially to the political views of

zu ihrer Entstehungsgeschichte," *Museum Helveticum*, 7 (1950), 1–13; 8 (1951), 190–215; 9 (1952), 204–243; 10 (1953), 103–24.

For the ceremonial dress and attributes of the emperor, see also Josef Deér, "Der Globus des spätrömischen und des byzantinischen Kaisers. Symbol oder Insigne?" *BZ*, 54 (1961), 53–85; *idem*, "Byzanz und die Herrschaftszeichen des Abendlandes," *BZ*, 50, (1957), 405–36; *idem*, "Das Kaiserbild im Kreuz," *Schweizer Beiträge zur allgemeinen Geschichte*, 13 (1955), 48–112; *idem*, "Der Ursprung der Kaiserkrone," *ibid.*, 8 (1950), 51–87; Konrad Kraft, "Der Helm des römischen Kaisers," *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen des deutschen Numismatikertages in Göttingen 1951*, ed. Erich Boehringer (Göttingen, 1959), 47–58; Percy E. Schramm, *Sphaira, Globus, Reichsapfel* (Stuttgart, 1958); *idem*, *Herrschaftszeichen und Staatssymbolik*, 1–3, *Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae historica*, 13, 1–3 (Stuttgart, 1954–56); Treitinger, *op. cit.* (n. 1 above). Cf. André Grabar, "Zur Geschichte von Sphaira, Globus und Reichsapfel," *HZ*, 191 (1960), 336–48; *idem*, *L'empereur* (n. 1 above); Eduard Eichmann, *Die Kaiserkrönung im Abendland*, 2 vols. (Würzburg, 1942).

On the numismatic iconography and imperial insignia of the house of Constantine, see the handsomely illustrated study by Maria R. Alföldi, *Die Constantinische Goldprägung* (Mainz, 1963).



Plato, Aristotle, Alexander the Great, and the Neo-Pythagoreans. I lay no claim to originality in my summaries of Greek philosophical texts, which I present here primarily because historians have not yet fully appreciated their significance for Byzantine history.

It is usually asserted that Greece gave the world philosophy, literature, and the arts, while Rome was the creator of law and legal institutions. Much evidence can be adduced in support of both of these propositions. But we must not minimize the Greek contributions in this field. Nor should it be forgotten that Plato and Aristotle provided the philosophical basis for the autocratic governments of Hellenistic Greece, Rome, and Byzantium. The rights and prerogatives of the Byzantine Βασιλεύς were modelled upon those of Hellenistic and Roman prototypes. But there can be no doubt that the whole development, from Hellenistic monarch to Roman emperor to Byzantine autocrat, rested ultimately upon the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of the propriety of the exercise of supreme sovereignty in the state by an unlimited, absolute ruler, unrestrained by either law or public opinion, and deemed to be in some sense comparable to a god.

The aspects of the Byzantine monarchy to which I will draw attention in what follows are the quasi-divine status of the emperor (reduced thus, because of Christian scruples, from an actual divinity to whom cult was paid), and the absolutism of his authority — his superiority to the law and his position as the chief source of legislation. It is perhaps conceivable that the example of foreign states may have strengthened the indigenous absolutistic tendencies of the Graeco-Roman world. But this cannot be proved, and it is more likely that the theoretical principles of kingship, as expounded by the Greek philosophers and carried into effect by Alexander the Great, proved popular in the Empires of Rome and Byzantium, because they corresponded to the "felt necessities of the times." Of course, despots seize power and rule their domains *vi et armis* without appealing to historical, literary, or philosophical precedents, which, nevertheless, inevitably affect their conduct in various ways. Conversely, despite the personal idiosyncrasies of

their authors, the formulations of the philosophers reflect, to some degree at least, the circumstances and ideals of the environment whence they spring.

### 1. *Plato*

According to a well-known episode in the *Iliad* (2,202 ff.) of Homer, Odysseus rebuked the Greek warriors who sought to abandon the siege of Troy and return to Greece with these familiar words, "By no means can all of us Achaeans be reckoned as kings here. *The rule of the many is not good*; *let there be one ruler, one king*." It is not surprizing to find such royalistic sentiments expressed by a spokesman for the aristocratic society of the Homeric age, which was accustomed to the rule of a king, governing with the advice and consent of his council of elders.[4]

What is more significant for the history of Greek political theory and its medieval evolution is that Plato,[5] the leading philo-

[4] Hermann Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2d. ed., *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. Iwan von Müller and Walter Otto, 3, 4 (Munich, 1960), 64 f.; Thomas D. Seymour, *Life in the Homeric Age* (N.Y., 1907), p. 78 ff.

[5] On Plato's view of politics, see A.E. Taylor, *Plato, the man and his work*, 7th ed. (London, 1960), p. 296 ff., 401 ff., 471 ff.; Jean Luccioni, *La pensée politique de Platon* (Paris, 1958), p. 246 ff.; Harold Cherniss, "Plato (1950–1957)," *Lustrum*, 5 (1960), 470–510: analyzes the recent literature on Plato's political philosophy; Francesco Adorno, "Dialettica e politica in Platone, saggio sul 'Politico' e sulle 'Leggi'," *Atti e memorie dell' Academia Toscana di scienze e lettere, La Colombaria*, 20, N.S. 6 (Florence, 1955), 97–200; Kathleen Freeman, *God, man and state: Greek concepts* (London, 1952); T.A. Sinclair, *A history of Greek political thought* (London, 1951); Paul Shorey, *What Plato said* (Chicago, 1933), p. 240 ff., 371; Ernest Barker, *Greek political theory: Plato and his predecessors* (London, 1918), p. 109, 149–51, 254–58, 271, 286, 288–91, 304, 311 ff., 341–43; B.C. Stephanides, *Die Stellung von Platons Politikos zu seiner Politeia und den Nomoi* (Heidelberg, 1913); Ludwig G. Myska, *Über das Verhältnis des von Plato im Politikos entwickelten Staatsbegriffes zu der Darstellung desselben in der Politeia und den Nomoi* (*Jahresbericht des königlichen Gymnasiums zu Allenstein*, 1891–92), Progr. No. 1. Cf. Glenn R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan city: a historical interpretation of the Laws* (Princeton, 1960); J.R. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman* (London, 1952), pp. 47–66.

The consensus of opinion is that Plato was not influenced by oriental or



sopher of Athens, which was the most brilliant democracy of the ancient world, not only distrusted democratic political institutions but also regarded the absolute monarchy of one wise and properly educated man, untrammeled by law or the consent of his people, as the ideal form of government — if such a man could be found. "Until philosophers are kings in our cities," Plato asserts in what is probably the most famous sentence (*Republic* 5, 473 cd) in the entire history of philosophy,[6] "or those now recognized as kings and rulers pursue wisdom with genuine and thorough devotion, and political power and the love of wisdom are joined together [in the same person or persons], while the numerous individuals who pursue one of these objectives apart from the other are forcibly excluded [from the government], neither our cities nor the human race, I believe, will cease to have trouble."

In general Plato does not make much distinction between a single ruler or a group of leaders,[7] if they were all philosophers, or, to translate the Greek word, *philosophoi*, literally, "lovers of wisdom." But the best of all forms of government, he holds, is that which is conducted by a wise man seeking justice and acting with wisdom and skill.[8] Such a man, he says, ruling by his own

Iranian thought: J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *The western response to Zoroaster* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 70–85; Walter Spoerri, "Encore Platon et l'Orient," *Revue de philologie*, 31=83 (1957), 209–233; W.J.W. Koster, *Le mythe de Platon, de Zarathoustra et des Chaldéens* (*Mnemosyne*, Supplement 3 [Leiden, 1951]); Jula Kerschensteiner, *Platon und der Orient* (Stuttgart, 1945). J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'Orient* (Brussels, 1945), is now the chief exponent of the contrary opinion. Many scholars admit that Plato may have known something about Iranian dualism but maintain that his system was not indebted to this source. See the admirable and painstaking summary by Harold Cherniss, "Plato (1950–57)," *Lustrum*, 4 (1959), 53–57.

[6] Book 5, 473 cd; cf. 6,499 abc. See Paul Shorey, *Plato, the Republic, Loeb classical library* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), which is in many ways the best of the innumerable translations and studies; cf. James Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Engl., 1902).

[7] *Republic*, 4, 445 de.

[8] *Statesman*, 292 e ff., 300 e – 301, 302 ff.; *Republic*, 6, 502–505, and books 6–7 *passim*; Marcello Gigante, ΝΟΜΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ (Naples, 1956); Hans E. Stier, ΝΟΜΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ, *Studien zur Geschichte der* ΝΟΜΟΣ–*Idee vornehmlich im* V. *und* IV. *Jhdt. v. Chr.* (Berlin, 1927), pp. 22–36.

wisdom alone, unrestricted by legislation of any kind, is the ideal ruler, and governs the state even more satisfactorily than if he were bound to follow a code of laws. As Plato puts it,[9] "the best thing is not that law should rule but rather a monarch endowed with wisdom." For, he contends, there is no law which can fit all times and the diverse conditions or requirements that arise in human society. Law, he says, is like an ignorant tyrant who will not allow his judgment to be questioned, whatever the circumstances may be.

Wise rulers, on the other hand, may be compared to the pilot[10] of a ship who saves his crew and vessel, not by following a set of rules, but by his nautical skill. Similarly, men of wisdom, whose political art is superior to law, are justified in governing as they see fit, provided that they faithfully observe the rule of dispensing the highest justice to their subjects with wisdom and skill, and are able to safeguard (σῴζειν) them and make them better than they were.

Plato does not mean to say that the ideal state should have absolutely no written laws, although in the *Republic* (note 17 below) he does maintain that written legislation is in general unnecessary. The perfect state actually does have laws or regulations which can be copied as models for the others.[11] But, he was convinced, the wise ruler or king should not be chained to the laws he himself has laid down, and should be free to violate them whenever he deems it prudent to do so. A government so constituted, he says, is the best of all, and is among states what a god is among men.[12]

As far as Plato is concerned, laws are useful only in the six types of polity which are inferior to that of his ideal state. But

9 *Statesman*, 294 a ff.; cf. Plato's *Protagoras*, 337 d ("Law is a tyrant over man, and requires much that is contrary to nature"). For a critique of Plato's repudiation of law, cf. George H. Sabine, *A history of political theory*, 2d ed. (N.Y., 1959), p. 63 ff., 68 ff.

10 *Statesman*, 296 e–297 b.

11 *Ibid.*, 297 d.

12 *Ibid.*, 300 cd, 303 b; the seventh of the constitutions (301 cd, 302 c, 303 b) is that of the ideal ruler.



he is very skeptical of laws in general, and not only goes so far as to authorize individuals or groups of men to break the laws which regulate their conduct when they have a higher principle in view, but also approves whatever steps they might take in this direction, "if the men are qualified," as on a par with truth itself, and worthy of comparison with the conduct of the true statesman.[13]

In the *Laws*, the work of his old age, Plato concerns himself with a mixed constitution, which combines the wise leadership of a monarch with some of the free institutions of democracy. But he makes it clear that this is only his second choice, the second best,[14] to which he devotes himself solely as a concession to reality because of the difficulty of attaining the perfect state described in the *Republic* and the *Statesman*. Even in the *Laws*, however, he asserts that the best government and laws come into being "when supreme power is vested in a man of wisdom and moderation, but never in any other way."[15] Farther on in the same dialogue, he reiterates the argument of the *Statesman* that laws are necessary only because of the dearth of men of true wisdom and discernment who need no laws to guide them, since, as he says, "there is no law or organization (τάξις) which is superior to knowledge."

For the "really true and liberated intellect" is, in Plato's words, "neither the subject nor slave of anything [or anybody] but the ruler of all."[16] In thus asserting the supremacy of mind and reason over all institutions, even law, Plato reaffirms in the *Laws* the ideal he had set forth in the *Republic* and the *Statesman* of the wise ruler who governs justly and seeks nothing but the unity and welfare of the people. The "really true and liberated intellect" of the *Laws* is thus nothing but the informed wisdom of the philosopher-king of the *Republic*, who relies solely on his learning, skill, and moral character, as attained through the Platonic program of education, and has no need of laws to regulate matters public or private. In placing the properly educated philosopher-king above and beyond the law, Plato is only making a logical, and for him

13 *Ibid.*, 294–297, 300 de.

14 *Laws*, 5, 739 ff.; 6, 756–57; 9, 874–75 d.

15 *Ibid.*, 4, 711 e–712 a.

16 *Ibid.*, 9, 875 cd.

deeply characteristic, application of his theory of education. If education is truly effective, he says, laws are unnecessary; but if education is not of the right sort, laws accomplish nothing, and the law-makers are "only cutting off the heads of a hydra."[17]

## 2. *Aristotle and Alexander the Great*

Plato's most famous disciple, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), who devoted a lifetime to criticizing and attacking his master's conclusions, nevertheless was unable, in the end, despite much carping in matters of detail, to avoid formulating a theory of absolute monarchy which has obvious kinship with its Platonic prototype. He twice quotes with approval the lines from Homer's *Iliad* cited above, once in the *Metaphysics* and once in the *Politics*, although in the former instance he makes use of them only as support for the argument that there can be no more than one metaphysical principle in the universe, and in the latter refrains from drawing any political conclusions.[18] In other contexts, however, he makes it clear that for him the best form of government is an absolute monarchy — the rule by one man — pre-eminent in the state for virtue and political skill — "like a god among men."[19] He concedes that the ideal is often unattainable,[20] that democracy is the most practicable for large cities, and that the best constitution realizable

17 *Republic*, 4, 423–27; cf. 6, 503–6 (n.b. 506 b), all of Bk. 7. See Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, 2 (N.Y., 1943), pp. 234–39. For a summary of recent work on Plato's theory of education see Harold Cherniss, "Plato (1950–57)," *Lustrum*, 5 (1960), 510–20.

18 *Metaphysics*, Λ, 10, 1076a, 4; *Politics*, 4, 4, 1292a, 13. Cf. Alexander Aphrodisiensis (3rd c.) in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, ed. M. Hayduck, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 1 (1891), 721. 28 ff.; Asclepius (3rd c.), *ibid.*, 6, 2 (see index); and Syrianus (6th c.), *ibid.*, 6, 1 (see index), in all of whom the context remains metaphysical rather than political.

The Greek word ἀρχή which Aristotle and his commentators had in mind here, can be translated in many different ways: beginning, principle, rule, government, etc.

19 *Politics*, 3, 13, 1284a, 3–11, 1284b, 27–34; 3, 17–18, 1288a, 9–1288b, 6; 4, 2, 1289a, 4–b 1; 7, 3, 1325b, 10–14; cf. 5, 10, 1310b, 9–12.

20 *Ibid.*, 4, 1, 1288b, 24–1289a, 1.



is what he calls a polity, which he defines as a mean between, or combination of, oligarchy and democracy.[21]

But whenever a man of outstanding virtue and political skill can be found, Aristotle insists, he must rule with absolute and unquestioned power, and is entitled to a position above and superior to all law. Law, he explains, "is necessary only for those who are equal in birth and capacity." For men of extraordinary intellectual stature and talent, however, "there is no law, since they are themselves a law (αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος), and anyone who tried to make laws for them would be ridiculous."[22] He compares men of this character to Zeus and concludes that "all men should joyfully obey such a ruler, in accord with what seems to be the law of nature, and that men like him should be kings in their cities for life."[23]

Aristotle's comparison of these paragons to a god or to Zeus and Plato's suggestion at the end of the ninth book of the *Republic* that the ideal state which he has been sketching may have no existence apart from the image of it laid up in heaven serve to indicate that both philosophers were well aware that the utopias of their dreams could not easily be established on earth. This impression is heightened by the fact that Plato in the *Statesman* and in the *Laws*, like Aristotle in the *Politics*, deemed it necessary to sketch designs for types of government which, though inferior to the best, had the merit of practicability. Nevertheless, both Plato and Aristotle professed to believe that their ideals were at

21 *Ibid.*, 3, 15, 1286b, 20 ff.; 4, 7 ff., 1293a, 39 ff., 1293b, 31 ff.

22 *Ibid.*, 3, 13, 1284a, 11–15; cf. Ernest Barker, *The Political thought of Plato and Aristotle* (London–N.Y., 1906), pp. 328–37. Sabine, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–105, does not give these words sufficient weight in his critique of Aristotle's *Politics*. For a commentary, see W.L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, 3 (Oxford, 1902), p. 243, 255 ff., and *passim*. Cf., with bibliography, Peter Trude, *Der Begriff der Gerechtigkeit in der aristotelischen Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* (*Neue Kölner rechtswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, 3 [Berlin, 1955]); Emmanuel Michelakis, *Platons Lehre von der Anwendung des Gesetzes und der Begriff der Billigkeit bei Aristoteles* (Munich, 1953); Wilhelm Oncken, *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1870–75), 2,277 ff.

23 *Politics*, 3, 13, 1284b, 27–34.

least conceivably feasible;[24] and their schemes have importance for the historian of early Christian and Byzantine political theory because of the great influence which they exerted in later times.

Plato made three attempts to translate his political ideas into practice in Syracuse, the chief city of the island of Sicily.[25] These ventures came to naught. But a few years after Plato's disillusionment with the tyrants of Syracuse, Aristotle's disciple, Alexander the Great (356–323 B.C.), rose to power and incarnated in his own person some important aspects of his master's political philosophy.[26] In the incredibly short space of fourteen years

[24] *Republic*, 5, 473 ab; 6,502 c; 7,540 d ff.; for Aristotle see notes 20 f. above.

[25] On Plato's three Sicilian expeditions, see bibliography in n. 5 above. Cf. Hermann Breitenbach, *Platon und Dion* (Zurich–Stuttgart, 1960): brief treatment. See especially Karl F. Stroheker, *Dionysius I., Gestalt und Geschichte des Tyrannen von Syrakus* (Wiesbaden, 1958), and Helmut Berve, *Dion* (*Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen der geistes – und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*, 10 [Wiesbaden, 1956]); Herman Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*, cited in note 4 above, 279, 283.

[26] W.W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Engl., 1948); cf. n. 29 below. Tarn, with whom I agree on the whole, believes Alexander sought deification, was influenced by Aristotle and Isocrates, and was the first to proclaim the unity and brotherhood of mankind. In partial agreement are Fritz Taeger, "Alexanders Gottkönigsgedanke und die Bewusstseinslage der Griechen und Makedonen," *The sacral kingship* (*La regalità sacra* [Leiden, 1959]), pp. 394–406; *idem*, *Charisma, Studien zur Geschichte des antiken Herrscherkultes*, 1 (Stuttgart, 1957), 191–224; Christian Habicht, *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte* (*Zetemata*, 14 [Munich, 1956]); reviewed by Charles Edson, *Classical philology*, 53 (1958), 61–65; E. Badian, "Alexander the Great and the unity of mankind," *Historia*, 7 (1958), 425–44; Philip Merlan, "Isocrates, Aristotle and Alexander the Great," *Historia*, 3 (1954), 60–81. In addition see Apostolos B. Daskalakes, "The deification of Alexander the Great and the plans for a Helleno-Asiatic empire" (in Greek), *Epistemonike epeteris tes philosophikes scholes tu Panepistemiu Athenon*, ed. Georgios T. Zoras, Second Series, 10 (Athens, 1959–60), 35–179, n.b. 140 ff., 158 ff.; *idem*, "The Greek inspiration of Alexander the Great," *ibid.*, 11 (1960–61), 79–232.

Generally contra are: Victor Ehrenberg, *Der Staat der Griechen*, 2, *Der hellenistische Staat* (Leipzig, 1958), 88 f.; Roberto Andreotti, "Die Weltmonarchie Alexanders des Grossen in Überlieferung und geschichtlicher Wirklichkeit," *Saeculum*, 8 (1957), 120–66, with full bibliography; *idem*, "Per una critica dell' ideologia di Alessandro Magno," *Historia*, 5 (1956), 257–302. E. Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, and C.A. Robinson, Jr., "The extraordinary ideas of Alexander the Great," *American historical review*, 62 (1956–57), 326–44; *idem*, *The history of Alexander the Great*, 1 (Providence, 1953), accept A's world view but do not believe he commanded the Greek city-states to deify him; J.P.V.D. Balsdon, "The 'divinity' of Alexander," *Historia*, 1 (1950), 363–88: denies that Isoc. or Aristotle influenced A. or that A. ordered his own deification. On the sources, see Lionel Pearson, *The lost histories of Alexander* (*American philological association, Philological monographs*, 20 [1960]). The letter Alexander is supposed to have written to Aristotle, of which nothing remains but a Latin version, is a falsification: *Epistola Alexandri ad Aristotelem*, ed. Walther W. Boer (The Hague, 1953).

On Hellenistic culture in general see Moses Hadas, *Hellenistic culture, fusion and diffusion* (N.Y., 1959), n.b. p. 15 ff., 20 f., 25; W.W. Tarn, *Hellenistic civilisation*, 3rd ed., G.T. Griffith (London, 1952).



Alexander created a great empire, which seemed destined to embrace all or most of what was then called "the inhabited world."

We lack evidence on Alexander's precise objectives and have no right to say that he intended to conquer the entire world and rule it himself.[27] Some have argued that he lusted voraciously for conquest precisely because he was seeking a laboratory large enough for testing and carrying out his new and epoch-making doctrine of the brotherhood and unity of all mankind. This interpretation is not very widely held, and many scholars maintain that Alexander never had any such intentions and never promulgated this extraordinary idea, although they admit that his unparalleled military successes prepared the way for its dissemination.

But those who hold that Alexander originated the concept of the brotherhood of man rely upon the proof that they find in his actual deeds (see notes 28&32 below) and upon Plutarch of Chaeronea (ca. 50–120), according to whom Alexander repudiated what Aristotle had once said about the fundamental difference between the Greeks and the barbarians. Aristotle had bidden Alexander to cultivate the former like friends and members of a family, Plutarch says, and to treat the latter as if they were nothing more than plants or animals. But Alexander spurned Aristotle's counsel

[27] Tarn, *Alexander*, 2, 378–398; Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, p. 17 f.

here and sought, instead, by appeal to reason, to secure harmony and peace for all men, and to show that all things were subject to one principle and included in one regime.[28]

There was nothing in these new concepts which would by themselves have fostered absolutism, but they were usually associated, as in Plutarch, with the notion of a high-minded monarch who promoted concord and unity throughout the inhabited world by his generosity and benevolence (*philanthropia*). Stated in these terms, belief in the brotherhood of the whole of mankind formed an essential feature of the later Hellenistic and imperial Roman idea of kingship, and served, in intellectual circles at least, to justify the institution of autocracy, especially when combined, as it was inevitably after the example of Alexander, with the designation of the head of the state as a god — a beneficent god.

The second element in this formula, that of a divinized ruler, may reflect an Aristotelian idea (see notes 19–23 above), with which Alexander may well have been familiar, either as it is to be found in the *Politics* or as communicated orally to him by Aristotle or by someone else. It seems idle to deny, as many do, that he was in some way acquainted[29] with Aristotle's precept that a man of pre-eminent virtue and political wisdom should have supreme power and a status proper for one who was "like a god among men." Whether or not this Aristotelian principle lay in Aristotelian the back of his mind, he acquiesced in the decision of the Greek cities to proclaim him a god, and probably ordered at least some of them to do so.

A number of historians (without sufficient reason, I think) reject the testimony of the ancient authorities who report that Alexander himself requested his own deification. But no one doubts that he

[28] Strabo, *Geographika*, 1, 4, 9, (66 f.); Plutarch, *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*, 1, 6–10, 329 A ff., ed. Daniel Wyttenbach, *Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia*, 2, 1 (Oxford, 1796), 348–60; cf. Plutarch, *Alexander* (life), 27, 5 f. See Tarn, *Alexander*, 2, 399–449, n.b. 421–23; Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, pp. 4–8,

[29] Tarn, *Alexander*, 2, 365–69; Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, pp. 11 f., doubts that Aristotle had anything to do with Alexander's deification. He believes that Persian court ceremonial was decisive here.



was formally deified, or that his divinity was accepted in 324 B.C., even in democratic Athens, which ultimately gave its consent, as did the irreconcilable democrat, Demosthenes himself.[30] For, the ancient Greeks, being accustomed to anthropomorphic representations of the deity from time immemorial, saw nothing incongruous in a legislative decree of apotheosis.

Tarn believes that Alexander deliberately intended in this way to enable himself to intervene as a god in the internal affairs of governments with whose autonomy he was forbidden *qua* man to interfere. Others disagree, and we have no way of knowing whether Alexander planned to extend the political exploitation of the divine honors he had been accorded still further in order to support and universalize his royal authority, although very few historians agree that this is what he had in mind. Whatever his goal may have been, his immediate successors and the Roman emperors used the recognition of their divinity by their subjects, along with the accompanying ruler-cult, as the "cement"[31] of empire and a

[30] The contemporary sources, the orators, Dinarchus, *Against Demosthenes*, 94, ed. F. Blass (Leipzig, 1888), 42.3 ff.; and Hyperides, *Against Demosthenes*, 31, 10 ff., ed. C. Jensen (Leipzig, 1917), 20.10 ff., state unequivocally that the Athenians conceded that Alexander might be regarded as a god. Hyperides gives the impression that Alexander requested deification. This is positively stated by writers of the second century: Aelian, *Varia historia*, 2, 19; 5, 12, ed. R. Hercher (Leipzig, 1887), 27.5–15; 74 f.; Plutarch, *Alexander*, 28, 1; *idem*, *Apophthegmata Laconica*, 219 E; Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, 6, 251 B. On the basis of this evidence, I prefer to hold with Tarn, *Alexander*, 1, last ch.; 2, 347–73, that Alexander actually sought deification. Cf. Émile (Aemilius) Beurlier, *De divinis honoribus quos acceperunt Alexander et successores ejus* (Paris, 1890).

[31] Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, pp. 207–14. On ruler cult see the works referred to in note 26 above; L. Cerfaux and J. Tondriau, *Un concurrent du Christianisme, le culte des souverains* (Tournai, 1957), with full bibliography; Martin P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, 2, 2d ed., Müller–Otto, *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, 5, 2 (1961), 132–85: Lily R. Taylor, *The divinity of the Roman Emperor* (*American philological association*, Philological Monographs, 1 [Middletown Conn., 1931]); Arthur D. Nock, "Σύνναος θεός," *Harvard studies in classical philology*, 41 (1930), 1–62. Cf. Ilona Opelt, "Zum Kaiserkult in der griechischen Dichtung," *Rheinisches Museum*, N.F., 103 (1960), 43–56; Robert Étienne, *Le culte impérial*

device for unifying and holding together the numerous and disparate cities, nations, and races over which they ruled.

Thus, despite its brevity, Alexander's reign ushered in a new chapter in the history of politics. However it came about, the divinization of the monarch opened up new reservoirs of arbitrary power, and facilitated the growth of autocracy. Another impulse in the same direction came from the later Stoics, if not from Zeno (d. 262 B.C.) himself, who took up into their preaching the social theory ascribed by Plutarch to Alexander, and by certain modern critics to Zeno. On the basis of reasoning which is to be found at least in germ in Zeno's *Republic*, the Stoics urged their followers to give up parochial attachment to the city-state, to regard all men as fellow citizens, and to consider themselves as citizens of the entire world — of the cosmopolis (world-state) rather than of a single city.[32] In disseminating these notions, the Stoics, who, it should be noted, were by no means unanimous in their political views,[33] played an important role in creating a milieu receptive to absolutism. Furthermore, in the centuries immediately prior and subsequent to the beginning of the Christian era, conditions in the Graeco-Roman world favored the development of strongly centralized government that concentrated power in the hands of one man.

*dans la péninsule ibérique d'Auguste à Dioclétien* (*Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, 191 [Paris, 1958]). Note also Édouard des Places, "Un poème du iiie siècle avant Jésus-Christ contre la divinisation des souverains," *Recherches de science religieuse*, 48 (1960), 55–61; H. Kruse, *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums* 19, 3 [Paderborn, 1934]).

[32] See note 28 above; Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, 1 2d ed. (Göttingen, 1959), 133, 137, 315, 551; 2, 2d ed. (*ibid.*, 1955), 75, 171; Émile Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l'ancien Stoïcisme* (Paris, 1951), p. 259 ff.; J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, 3 (Leipzig–Berlin, 1923), fr. 333–339; Tarn, *Alexander*, 2, 399 ff. Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, p. 7 f., 39 f., is convinced that Alexander was the first to teach the unity and brotherhood of all men, but doubts that he influenced Zeno. See additional note at the end of section 4 below.

[33] Tarn, *Alexander*, 2, 399 ff., 409 ff., 417–426, insists that Zeno and the early Stoics were opposed to kingship. It should be remembered, however, that the Stoic philosophy did not involve an ideal state, but an ideal world,



How far the new philosophical theories penetrated to the level of the common people, it is impossible to determine. But they had a great vogue among Christian theologians (see below), who erected upon this basis the trinomial expression: one God, one world, one emperor.

### 3. *Hellenistic Kingship*

The pagan Greeks of the Hellenistic age and the first three centuries of the Christian era looked upon the emperor as the imitator of God, who was as such responsible for the harmony, prosperity, and welfare of his subjects. In this capacity he was described as the father of his country (*pater* or *parens patriae*),

in which, as Tarn points out, harmony had been established from the beginning by its creator. On the other hand, there is no evidence that Zeno favored monarchy (cf. Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, p. 34, 205–207); and Diogenes Laertius (7, 131), around the beginning of the third century of our era, in a statement apparently based upon the treatises on government written by Zeno and Chrysippus, says that they deemed the best form of government to be a mixture of democracy, monarchy, and aristocracy. Chrysippus said a wise man would take part in politics, unless doing so would damage him (Seneca quoted a similar statement by Zeno), and would accept the kingship if it were offered him, or would at least advise and live with a king (J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, 2 [Leipzig, 1923], fr. 271; 3 [Leipzig, 1923], fr. 691, 697).

But the sources do not say that Chrysippus preferred monarchy to other forms of government. In later times, some Stoics like Helvidius Priscus, the son-in-law of the famous P. Clodius Thrasea Paetus, who was executed by Nero, revolted against autocracy, while the Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161–180) did not spurn the throne because of his devotion to Stoicism. The Stoic philosopher Seneca (d. 65), who had been Nero's tutor and counsellor, maintained (*De otio*, 8) that there was no government in which the wise man could profitably take an active part, but he also addressed a panegyric on kingship to the Emperor Nero (*De clementia*; see the extracts translated by Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, pp. 236–238). See Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, 1 (Göttingen, 1959), 137–140, 205 f., 282–90; 2, 2d ed. (*ibid.*, 1955), 75 f., 102, 144–148, with bibliography; *idem*, *Staatsgedanke und Staatslehre der Griechen* (Leipzig, 1923), p. 69. Cf. Margaret E. Reesor, *The political theory of the old and middle Stoa* (New York, 1951), pp. 18–20, 23 f.; Werner Mann, *Beitrag zur Kenntnis der sozial- und staatsphilosophischen Anschauungen der Hauptvertreter der neueren Stoa* (Halle [Saale], 1936); Josef Kargl, *Die Lehre der*

the good shepherd, the savior (*soter*) of his people, appointed to watch over them and their interests, just as the pilot is entrusted with his ship, and the doctor with his patients. He was the true philosopher ("lover of wisdom") and benefactor (εὐεργέτης) of mankind, and was supposed in his dealings with his people to show himself to be *philanthropos* (φιλάνθρωπος: benevolent or kindly), *philadelphos* (φιλάδελφος: manifesting brotherly love), and, above all, just, merciful, pious, virtuous, and god-like in all his activities.[34]

This catalogue of imperial virtues, which goes back in some respects as far as Homer (e.g., the leader as "shepherd") and Plato, is to be found especially in the works of pagan writers of the early Christian period like the orator Dio Chrysostom of Prusa in Bithynia (a province in Asia Minor), who flourished during the second half of the first century of the Christian era (ca. 40–112), and wrote four famous orations on kingship; of the great biographer and essayist, Plutarch of Chaeronea in Greece (see above); Musonius Rufus, a Stoic sage of the first century of the Christian era; the orator Aelius Aristides (ca. 120–189); and the sophist Philostratus (ca. 170–250).[35]

More significant for the present inquiry, however, is a trio of neo-Pythagorean philosophers named Diotogenes, Ecphantus, and Sthenidas,[36] who may have lived anywhere from the fourth century before Christ to the third of the Christian era. The uncertainty as to the date arises from the fact that the extant fragments

*Stoiker vom Staat* (Erlangen, 1913), p. 63, 75 f.; and *passim*; E. Vernon Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (Cambridge, Engl., 1911); A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1892).

34 For a summary of these epithets, see Francis Dvornik, "The Emperor Julian's 'reactionary' ideas on kingship," *Late classical and mediaeval studies in honor of Albert Mathias Friend, Jr.* (Princeton, 1955), p. 72 ff.; Barker (in next note); Cerfaux–Tondriau, *Le culte des souverains*, p. 382, 404, and index under terms *pater patriae*, *euergetes*, *philanthropos*, *soter*, etc.; Norman H. Baynes, *Byzantine studies and other essays*, pp. 168–172; Delatte, *op. cit.* (n. 37 below), p. 249 f. and *passim*; Berlinger, *op. cit.* (n. 1 above).

35 Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine*, p. 7 f., 10 f., 13–15, 277, 295–310, 324–31, 343.

36 *Ibid.*, 362 ff.



of their writings, which provide a notable summary of Hellenistic political theory,[37] were composed in Doric Greek. But it cannot be determined whether this specimen of the dialect goes back to the third or second century B.C. (as seems likely to me) or was produced a few hundred years thereafter (as most of the authorities now maintain).

For Diotogenes the emperor is animate law (νόμος ἔμψυχος in Greek; *lex animata* in Latin),[38] that is living law, or, he add, alternatively, the legitimate ruler, who is accordingly the most righteous and most law-abiding of men. The emperor bears the same relation to the state that God bears to the universe. Hence, he holds absolute power and has the role of god among men.[39] Somewhat similarly, Ecphantus pronounces the emperor to be the most divine creature among men, who had been created by God in his own image. The terrestrial monarch is the reflection of God, possesses virtue by grace of God, and is God's partner. Salvation for men is won by contemplating and imitating the emperor, just as the latter ascends to glory by meditating upon God.[40]

37 These three treatises have been edited, translated, and discussed in detail by Louis Delatte, *Les traités de la royauté d'Ecphante, Diotogène, et Sthénidas* (*Bibliothèque de la faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Liège*, 97 [Liège–Paris, 1942]). For a somewhat similar but very differently expressed summary of Hellenistic political theory, see *Aristeas to Philocrates* (*Letter of Aristeas*), 187–292, ed. and transl. Moses Hadas (N.Y., 1951), p. 172 ff.

38 Delatte, *op. cit.*, 37. 9 ff., 245 ff.; cf. Musonius Rufus, *Reliquiae*, ed. O. Hense (Leipzig, 1905), 37.2, with parallel passages cited, including Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 8, 1, 22, who refers to the Persian monarchs as βλέποντα νόμον ("seeing law"). These words suggest to Goodenough, *loc. cit.* (in n. 1 above), 78, that the idea of the ruler as animate law may have some Persian roots. But this is doubtful. See Arthur Steinwerter, "*Nomos empsychos*: *zur* Geschichte einer politischen Theorie," *Anzeiger, Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Vienna, Philosoph.-hist. Kl., 83 (1946), 250–68. Cf. W. Richardson, "The Philonic patriarchs as Νόμος Ἔμψυχος," *Studia patristica*, 1, *Texte und Untersuchungen*, 5. R. 8 = 63 (Berlin, 1957), 515–25.

39 Delatte, *op. cit.*, 39.7–13, 255.

40 *Ibid.*, pp. 25–37, 164 ff., Sthenidas (*ibid.*, 46) says that the king is wise, imitates God, and serves Him.

### 4. *Christian Adaptation of Pagan Political Theory*

These notions of the god-like attributes of the ruler were not offensive to the Christian Church, except in so far as they were associated with the belief that the emperor was a god, and should be the recipient of cult. On this latter point, of course, the Christians always proved adamant, and the primary task of Christian political theorists in the fourth century was to work out a formula that would render the ancient doctrine of divine kingship acceptable by eliminating its most blatantly heathen elements.

Many theologians had a hand in this process of transformation. But the chief architect of compromise was Eusebius [41]of Caesarea in Palestine (d. ca. 339), the famous ecclesiastical historian and biographer of Constantine I, who framed a system of political theory based on pagan sources that won immediate acceptance in the Christian Church. What Eusebius and other Christian theologians did to Christianize these pagan ideas was to transform the emperor[42] from a god into the vicegerent of God, divinely appointed, inspired, and endowed with more than ordinary wisdom and grace.

In this view, the Empire itself was Christian and eternal; and the emperor was described not only as divine, most Christian, most beloved of God, and perpetual Augustus, but also as the elect one, chosen by God to be his collaborator and messenger, the friend of Christ (or of God), who had bestowed upon him sovereignty and power.[43] Though not himself a god, the emperor

41 Wilhelm Ensslin, *Gottkaiser und Kaiser von Gottes Gnaden*, Sitzungsberichte, Munich (1943), Heft 6, 53 ff.; Norman H. Baynes, "Eusebius and the Christian Empire," *Byzantine studies and other essays*, pp. 168–72.

42 Baynes, *loc. cit.* in previous note.

43 For texts and references, see my "Political theory in the lives of the Slavic Saints Constantine and Methodius," *Harvard Slavic Studies*, 2, Dedicated to Professor Francis Dvornik (1954), 12 ff., 29 ff. Cf. F.E. Cranz, "Kingdom and polity in Eusebius," *Harvard Theological Review*, 45 (1952), 47–66. See also Theodoretus, H.E., 1, 1. edd. Léon Parmentier and Felix Scheidweiler, *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte*, 44 (19) (Leipzig, 1954), 5. 5–7; *PG*, 82, 884 A.



operated on earth as God's agent and, under divine guidance, was enabled to establish on earth a kingdom that was a replica of the eternal heavenly kingdom of God.

Details concerning the manner in which this translation from pagan to Christian was worked out cannot be given in this article. But it is significant that the divine or semi-divine qualities with which the philosopher-king had been invested by the pagan philosophers were accepted without qualms by Christian political theorists.

### Additional Note

Tarn argues (*loc. cit.* and "Alexander the Great and the unity of mankind." *Proceedings of the British Academy* [1933], 123–66) that neither Diogenes (ca. 404–323 B.C.) nor Zeno espoused the doctrine of the brotherhood of man. In styling himself a *kosmopolites* (Diogenes Laertius, 6, 63; cf. 6, 72), Tarn contends, Diogenes merely meant that he was a part of nature — of the whole *cosmos*, and, hence, indifferent to mankind. Zeno, on the other hand, he holds, had reference to the unity of all *wise* men, not to any all-embracing universal state, to which all men, good and evil, wise and foolish, would belong. The most recent adherent of this view is H.C. Baldry, "The idea of the unity of mankind," *Grecs et barbares* (Fondation Hardt, *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique*, 8 [Vandoeuvres–Geneva, 1961], 167–204, who, however, refuses to regard Alexander as the first to profess the idea of the unity of mankind, which, according to him, did not reach full maturity until the time of Cicero and Seneca. Nevertheless, Tarn's critics seem to me oversubtle in protesting, as they do, that Alexander was unacquainted with this ideal, although they admit that much of what he did indicated a "tendency" in that direction.